Understanding the real implications of mass incarceration, which Littman acquired through his legal work, provides fodder for his scientific efforts to explore the sub-constitutional regulation of incarceration. “My experience of running a campaign to prevent Alabama sheriffs from pocketing food in prisons and enriching themselves through federal detention contracts was the duration of a recent article discussing how sheriffs shape both the supply and demand for prison beds and their incentives for expansion,” Littman explained. “And the substantial and procedural hurdles I`ve encountered repeatedly when making constitutional claims for prisoners` rights have led me to wonder in another article what role standards and regulatory mechanisms — from local food safety inspections to federal Medicaid policies — play in shaping conditions behind bars.” Littman looks forward to advancing his scholarship at UCLA. “I was very fortunate to spend three years as a Fellow at UCLA before joining the faculty, among colleagues who are national opinion leaders in everything from racialized policing to crim migration, from qualified immunity to fines and fees, from prison labor to the Eighth Amendment. It was an extraordinarily rich and supportive environment in which to grow up as a young scientist. 10Important, O. Holmes urges us to recognize that what characterizes all legal systems is the fact that they are systems of rules that have consequences in the form of physical coercion or violence. Traditionally, definitions of law in many philosophies have generally viewed violence or coercion as a means of realizing the law rather than as an essential feature of the law itself. Theories that attempt to distinguish the law from violence as a distinction between end and means have not been able to establish generally accepted criteria for distinguishing legal norms from moral or habitual rules, without their arguments being based on involuntary or infinite regression based on necessity, the existence or possibility of coercion.
Such theories lead to an in-depth discussion of legal norms concerning form or purpose, the authority of the person who issued them, or the authority of the person to whom they are addressed. This is not satisfactory when a simple definition is at hand. 34The study of legal consciousness developed directly from the various contributions of the different disciplines. I have described this in detail elsewhere  and therefore I will not mention the specific sources as indicated in the footnotes of the texts you have read . However, two smaller points are worth mentioning. We called ourselves “The Amherst Seminar on Legal Processes and Ideology”; the second published book, which we produced together throughout the seminar, was a special edition of the Law & Society Review 1988 devoted to the ideology of law.  Starting with the more materialistic and structuralist orientations with which we were trained in the various disciplines, attention to ideology was central as we struggled to understand how to understand the then quite substantial and growing canon of legal and social research. For a long time, the sociology of law has been busy observing, describing, and documenting the actual functioning of legal institutions – what they did and how they did it. As a critical project, it seemed sufficient to show that legal institutions did not function as they claimed.
Over time, however, this activity of “desecration” itself became routine, so that it no longer posed a challenge to institutionalized power, as it accepted that what was called law and action in books was not the same thing. Difference has become an accepted social fact – just as things were. Part of the critical fringe of the science of social law was lost when scholars set out to show the legal system how its legal ideals – principles – were missing and how the legal system – the rule of law – could function as it should. 36 Although studies on legal consciousness as a theoretical concept have been developed among social law scholars to explain how the institutional power of law is maintained over long periods of time, space and variable benefits, the term jurisprudence is increasingly used to refer to thoughts, the ideas and actions of individual actors in relation to the law. As Patricia Ewick and I wrote recently, too much science about legal consciousness has “sought hegemony in the wrong places by focusing on the people rather than the institution.”  38At this stage, this research shifted the empirical focus from a concern for both formal legal actors and legal material to what had been referred to in sociological theory as the living environment, the daily life of ordinary people. For the most part, but not completely, the researchers have given up focusing on measurable behavior and the revival of Weber`s conception of social action by incorporating analyses of the meanings and interpretative communication of social transactions. that help you communicate and interpret social relationships, even if the law may seem distant or formally absent. Important, and perhaps most fundamentally, the transition to everyday life and the cultural meanings of social action required a willingness to move from indigenous categories of actors as subjects of study, for example the rules of the State, the formal institutions of law, activities in the official legal framework conditions to the analytical concept of legal consciousness: that is, how legality is a continuous structure of social action . European social theory had answered similar questions with the concepts of consciousness, ideology and hegemony in order to understand how systems of government are not only tolerated but also accepted by subordinate populations .
71In this conceptualization, we intend to push the limits of what we study under the rubric of law; As I said, we are doing this quite deliberately in order to find the necessary support for this permanent institution. Nevertheless, we are careful not to go too far. We are aware of the dangers associated with the inclusion of all normative activities in the field of law.